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The Role of Patent Eligibility in Policing Claim Scope
&KULVWRSKHU0+ROPDQ
Four Supreme Court decisions dating back to the 1970s and early 1980s (Benson,1
Flook,2 Chakrabarty,3 and Diehr4) provide the foundation for the modern doctrine of patent
eligibility. The criterion for patent eligibility established by these cases is easy to state, at
least in the abstract. Under the controlling precedent, a patent claim limited to a man-made
invention falling within the statutory categories established under Section 101 (processes,
compositions of matter, machines, and articles of manufacture) is generally treated as patent
eligible.5 However, a patent claim is patent ineligible (and hence invalid) if it “claims” or
´SDWHQWVµDVRFDOOHG´IXQGDPHQWDOSULQFLSOHµ6SHFLÀFH[DPSOHVRIIXQGDPHQWDOSULQFLSOHV
WKDWKDYHEHHQLGHQWLÀHGE\WKH6XSUHPH&RXUWLQFOXGHQDWXUDOSKHQRPHQDSK\VLFDO
phenomena, principles of nature and abstract ideas. To my mind, the designations natural
phenomena, physical phenomena, principles of nature and laws of nature are all essentially
V\QRQ\PRXVDWOHDVWDVXVHGLQWKLVFRQWH[WVRIRUVLPSOLFLW\WKURXJKRXWWKHUHVWRIWKLV
article I simply refer to the two fundamental categories of abstract ideas and natural
phenomena.
Most of the Supreme Court’s treatment of patent eligibility has focused on the “abstract
idea” category of fundamental principle, including Benson, Flook, Diehr and the recent Bilski
II decision.6 The only Supreme Court decisions to address the other category of fundamental
principle are Chakrabarty and J.E.M., both of which rejected (at least implicitly) the
FRQWHQWLRQWKDWDJHQHWLFDOO\PRGLÀHGRUJDQLVPLVDSDWHQWLQHOLJLEOHQDWXUDOSKHQRPHQRQ7
Moreover, since the enactment of the 1952 patent statute the Supreme Court has never found
a patent claim patent ineligible for claiming a natural phenomenon. Some would argue that
earlier decisions of the Court found claims directed towards biological materials patent
ineligible, most notably Funk Brothers8 and American Fruit Growers,9 but in my view
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Missouri—Kansas City School of Law.
1. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
2. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
3. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
4. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
5. 35 U.S.C. § 101.
6. Bilski v. Kappos (Bilski II), 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010).
7. J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124 (2001).
$P)UXLW*URZHUV,QFY%URJGH[&R86  
9. Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948).
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these cases are addressing issues distinct from the modern doctrine of patent eligibility,
DQGWRWKHH[WHQWWKH\PLJKWKDYHKDGDQ\EHDULQJRQSDWHQWHOLJLELOLW\WKH\KDYHEHHQ
effectively overruled by more recent Supreme Court precedent, most particularly
Chakrabarty.10
While the Supreme Court has been consistent in maintaining that fundamental
principles cannot be patented, a striking aspect of the Supreme Court precedent in this
DUHDLVWKHODFNRIDQ\PHDQLQJIXOFRKHUHQWJXLGDQFHDVWRMXVWH[DFWO\ZKDWLWPHDQV
for a claim to “claim a fundamental principle.” This ambiguity was noted recently in a
concurrence by Justice Stevens to Bilski II, wherein he complained:
The Court, in sum, never provides a satisfying account of what constitutes
DQXQSDWHQWDEOHDEVWUDFWLGHD>,QWKLVFDVHIRUH[DPSOHWKH@&RXUW
essentially asserts its conclusion that petitioners’ application claims an abstract idea. This mode of analysis (or lack thereof) may have led to the correct outcome in this case, but it also means that the Court’s musings on this
issue stand for very little.11
Justice Stephen correctly recognizes the lack of Supreme Court guidance on what it
means to patent an abstract idea, but I would point out that the Court has provided even
less guidance with respect to natural phenomena.
The Federal Circuit has also noted the ambiguity of the Supreme Court’s patent
HOLJLELOLW\SUHFHGHQWDQGWKHSUDFWLFDOGLIÀFXOW\ORZHUFRXUWVIDFHLQDWWHPSWLQJWRDSSO\
WKHDEVWUDFWVWDQGDUGWRDFWXDOFODLPVSDUWLFXODUO\FODLPVGLUHFWHGWRWZHQW\²ÀUVWFHQWXU\
WHFKQRORJ\WKDWLVGLIÀFXOWWRDQDORJL]HWRWKHFODLPVDQDO\]HGLQWKH6XSUHPH&RXUW
decisions establishing the controlling precedent. I believe it was largely this ambiguity
that motivated the Federal Circuit in In re Bilski (Bilski I) to create the machine or
WUDQVIRUPDWLRQWHVW 0257 DVWKHVROHDQGGHÀQLWLYHWHVWIRUSDWHQWHOLJLELOLW\LQDQ
DWWHPSWWRSURYLGHWKHORZHUFRXUWVDQG863DWHQWDQG7UDGHPDUN2IÀFH 372 ZLWKD
more objective and administrable test.12
I.

The Effect of Bilski II on the Criterion for Patent Eligibility

Prior to Bilski I, the prevailing view of the patent community was that patent eligibility
hinges upon whether or not a claim wholly preempts the practical applications of a

10. This interpretation of Funk BrothersZDVSXWIRUZDUGLQDQDPLFXVFXULDHEULHIÀOHGE\$OQ\ODP3KDUPDceuticals in support of Myriad Genetics in its appeal to the Federal Circuit of the decision in Ass’n for MoOHFXODU%LRORJ\Y863DWHQW 7UDGHPDUN2IÀFH, Federal Circuit docket number 2010-1406. I commented
upon the Alynlam brief on my blog, available at http://holmansbiotechipblog.blogspot.com/2010/11/amicusEULHIÀOHGE\DO\QODPKWPO
11. 130 S. Ct. at 3236 (Stevens, J., Ginsburg, J., Breyer, J., Sotomayor, J., concurring).
12. In re Bilski (Bilski I), 545 F.3d 943, 954 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
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fundamental principle, which I refer to as the “preemption test.”13 Under this test, a claim
is patent ineligible if it effectively preempts all substantial practical applications of the
fundamental principle. However, in 2008, in an attempt to impose more objectivity and
predictability on the heretofore vaguely articulated doctrine, the en banc Federal Circuit in
Bilski I HVWDEOLVKHG0257DVWKHVROHDQGGHÀQLWLYHWHVWIRUWKHSDWHQWHOLJLELOLW\RIDOOSURFHVV
claims (leaving largely unresolved the appropriate test for patent eligibility of product claims).
But the preeminence of MORT was to prove short-lived, with the Supreme Court
intervening in 2010 with its Bilski IIGHFLVLRQZKLFKH[SOLFLWO\KHOGWKDWZKLOH0257
FDQEHKLJKO\SUREDWLYHRISDWHQWHOLJLELOLW\LWLVQRWWKHVROHDQGGHÀQLWLYHWHVWBilski II
DOVRPDNHVFOHDUDWOHDVWLPSOLFLWO\WKDWDÀQGLQJRISUHHPSWLRQLVQRWDSUHUHTXLVLWHIRU
invalidating a claim for lack of patent eligibility.14 But as pointed out by Justice Stevens,
Bilski II provides no additional guidance with respect to what the test for patent eligibility
LVRWKHUWKDQDQDGPRQLWLRQWRFRQVXOWWKHSDWHQWVWDWXWHIRULWVGHÀQLWLRQRIWKHWHUP
“process,” and to look “to the guideposts in Benson, Flook, and Diehr.”15 The essence of
Bilski II was succinctly captured by two commentators who characterized the decision as
the Supreme Court pushing a reset button on the doctrine of patent eligibility.16
:KLOHQHLWKHUWKHSUHHPSWLRQWHVWQRU0257FRQVWLWXWHVWKHGHÀQLWLYHWHVWIRUSDWHQW
eligibility, Bilski II clearly permits lower courts the discretion to use these tests in assessing
patent eligibility. In the absence of any other meaningful objective criteria to guide the
LQTXLU\,SUHGLFWWKDWWKHFRXUWVDQG372ZLOOFRQWLQXHWRUHO\KHDYLO\ DQGLQVRPHFDVHV
H[FOXVLYHO\ RQWKHVHWHVWVDQGHDUO\LQGLFDWLRQVDUHWKDWWKLVLVWKHFDVHLQWKH)HGHUDO
Circuit, district courts, and the PTO Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (BPAI).17
%RWKRIWKHVHDSSURDFKHVWRDVVHVVLQJSDWHQWHOLJLELOLW\DUHVSHFLÀFDOO\LGHQWLÀHGLQWKH
PTO’s Interim Guidance for Determining Subject Matter Eligibility for Process Claims in
View of Bilski v. Kappos.18
6LJQLÀFDQWO\ERWKWKHSUHHPSWLRQWHVWDQG0257WUHDWFODLPVFRSHDVDFULWLFDO
FRQVLGHUDWLRQLQDVVHVVLQJSDWHQWHOLJLELOLW\'LVFUHWLRQDU\ÁH[LELOLW\LQWKHDSSOLFDWLRQ
of these tests effectively empowers the courts and PTO to invoke patent eligibility as a
doctrinal policy lever for policing claim scope. In the remainder of this essay, I discuss the
role of patent eligibility in regulating claim scope.

13. See infra Part III.
14. Id.
15. Donald Chisum has made a similar observation. See Donald S. Chisum, Patenting Intangible Methods:
Revisiting Benson (1972) After Bilksi 1 (Working Paper, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1698724.
16. Gerry J. Elman & Jerome R. Smith, Jr., What Kinds of Inventive Processes Are Patentable?, ELMAN TECH.
LAW, P.C. (June 30, 2010), http://elman.com/2010/06/bilskireport-elman-smith/.
17. See infra Parts III, IV. See also Mark A. Lemley et al., Life after Bilski, STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1725009.
18. Interim Guidance for Determining Subject Matter Eligibility for Process Claims in View of Bilski v. Kappos, 75 Fed. Reg. 43,922 (July 27, 2010).
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II.

Patent Eligibility as a Restriction on Claim Scope

While patent eligibility can be conceptualized as a threshold screen to determine whether
or not an innovation can be patented, in many cases the doctrine functions more as a tool for
calibrating the scope of protection afforded an invention.19)RUH[DPSOHLQChakrabarty the
372UHMHFWHGWKHFODLPDWLVVXHLQWKHDSSHDOZKLFKEURDGO\UHFLWHVDJHQHWLFDOO\PRGLÀHG
bacterium per se, but allowed other claims reciting Dr. Chakrabarty’s invention in more
narrow terms.206RPHRIWKHLQLWLDOO\DOORZHGFODLPVDSSHDURQWKHLUIDFHWREHTXLWHEURDG
including claims reciting the method of producing the new bacteria, and claims reciting an
LQRFXOXPFRPSULVHGRIWKHQHZEDFWHULDLQFRPELQDWLRQZLWKDFDUULHUPDWHULDOÁRDWLQJRQZDWHU
5HFDOOWKDWWKHGHÀQLQJIHDWXUHRI'U&KDNUDEDUW\·VEDFWHULDZDVWKHLUDELOLW\WREUHDN
down multiple components of crude oil, the primary utility of which was believed to be in
the treatment of oil spills. Practically speaking, use of the bacteria for this purpose would
DOPRVWFHUWDLQO\UHTXLUHWKHXVHRIDQLQRFXOXPFDSDEOHRIÁRDWLQJRQZDWHUVRLWZRXOG
seem that the originally allowed claims would have provided the inventor with reasonably
H[SDQVLYHSDWHQWFRYHUDJHIRUKLVLQYHQWLRQ,WZDVRQO\DWWKHSRLQWZKHUH'U&KDNUDEDUW\
sought a claim broadly reciting the bacteria per seWKDWWKHSDWHQWRIÀFHEDONHGLQYRNLQJWKH
doctrine of patent eligibility in an attempt to limit the scope of the allowed claims.
While the Supreme Court ultimately reversed the PTO’s decision in Chakrabarty, in
other cases the PTO has been more successful in invoking the doctrine of patent eligibility
to rein in the scope of patent protection afforded to an otherwise patentable invention. For
H[DPSOHLQIn re Nuijten the inventor had come up with a method for reducing distortion in
a digital signal caused by the introduction of a “watermark,” which involved embedding the
watermark’s signal with supplemental data.21 The PTO allowed ten claims directed toward
the process itself, and another four claims directed towards articles of manufacture used to
perform the process, including a claim to a “storage medium having stored thereon a signal
with embedded supplemental data.” These claims would appear to provide relatively broad
protection for the invention, but in this case the inventor again asked for more, this time in
the form of claims reciting the “signal” per se. The PTO rejected this broad claim to a signal
as patent ineligible, unconstrained as it was to any tangible medium, and in this case the
)HGHUDO&LUFXLWDIÀUPHGKROGLQJWKDWWKHVLJQDOGLGQRWIDOOZLWKLQDQ\RIWKHIRXUVWDWXWRU\
categories of patentable subject matter.
III.

The Preemption Test Explicitly Focuses on Claim Scope

The role of preemption analysis in assessing patent eligibility dates back to Benson,
wherein the Court opined that if the patent ineligible claims had been allowed to issue in

19. The role of patent eligibility in policing claim scope was recently noted by Lemley et al., supra note 17.
20. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 305-06 (1980).
21. 500 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
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a patent, they would have entirely preempted every “substantial practical application” of
a mathematical algorithm, such that the practical effect would have been patent on the
mathematical algorithm itself.22 Prior to Bilski I, a claim’s preemptive effect was often
treated as the primary, if not only, relevant consideration in assessing whether a claim is
patent ineligible for patenting a fundamental principle.
)RUH[DPSOHLQDEULHIVXEPLWWHGWRWKH6XSUHPH&RXUWLQFRQQHFWLRQZLWKLabCorp,
the United States government as amicus curiae focused entirely on issues of preemption
in considering the patent eligibility of the claim, summing up the applicable test for
patent eligibility as “no one can patent process that comprises every substantial practical
application of a law of nature, because such a patent in practical effect would be a patent on
the law of nature itself.”23 The government opined that under the broad construction adopted
in the lower courts the claim appeared to cover all substantial practical applications of a
natural phenomenon, which would in its view render the claim patent ineligible. However,
LWZHQWRQWRREVHUYHWKDWVLQFHWKHFODLPLVOLPLWHGWRDVVD\LQJD´ERG\ÁXLGµUHVHDUFKHUV
or physicians might be able to employ the natural phenomenon implicated by the claim
(i.e., the correlation between total homocysteine and vitamin B) without infringing the
SDWHQWPHUHO\E\XVLQJDQDOWHUQDWHDSSURDFKWKDWGRHVQRWHQWDLODVVD\LQJDERG\ÁXLG
implying that this opportunity to decide around the claim would render it patent eligible.
The government’s brief goes on to point out that a more narrowly drafted diagnostic claim,
covering some but not all substantial practical applications of a natural phenomenon, should
be considered clearly patent eligible.
Similarly, in a guidance document issued shortly after the Supreme Court granted
certiorari in LabCorp, the PTO set forth a test for patent eligibility that focuses largely on
whether the claim covers every substantial practical application of principle.24 A test based
on preemption would hold an obvious appeal for the PTO, because it has the potential to
SURYLGHLWVFRUSVRIH[DPLQHUVZLWKDUHODWLYHO\REMHFWLYHDQGUHYLHZDEOHFULWHULRQIRUSDWHQW
HOLJLELOLW\%\IRFXVLQJH[SOLFLWO\RQFODLPVFRSHSUHHPSWLRQDQDO\VLVLVTXLWHDQDORJRXV
WRRWKHUSDWHQWDELOLW\DQDO\VHVSHUIRUPHGE\SDWHQWH[DPLQHUVVXFKDVH[DPLQDWLRQIRU
novelty, nonobviousness, and enablement.
While the preemption test is undoubtedly useful and relevant, the Supreme Court has
unambiguously established that preemption is not the sole test for patent eligibility, and
WKDWDÀQGLQJRISUHHPSWLRQLVQRWDSUHUHTXLVLWHWRFODLPLQYDOLGDWLRQEDVHGRQSDWHQW
ineligibility. In FlookIRUH[DPSOHWKHSDWHQWDSSOLFDQWDUJXHGWKDWXQGHUBenson its claim
should be patent eligible because it did not preempt all substantial practical applications of

22. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71-72 (1972).
23. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 20, Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc.,
86   1R  LQWHUQDOTXRWHVRPLWWHG :/
372,QWHULP*XLGHOLQHVIRU([DPLQDWLRQRI3DWHQW$SSOLFDWLRQVIRU3DWHQW6XEMHFW0DWWHU(OLJLELOLW\ ,QWHULP6XEMHFW0DWWHU(OLJLELOLW\*XLGHOLQHV 2II*D]3DW2IÀFH 1RY 
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a mathematical algorithm, implicitly reading Benson as though it established preemption as
WKHGHÀQLWLYHWHVWIRUSDWHQWHOLJLELOLW\25 The Court, however, rejected this argument.
The Flook Court agreed with the patent applicant that since the claim was limited to
applications in the petrochemical industry, it did not “wholly preempt the mathematical
formula,” and left other uses of the formula in the public domain. Nonetheless, the
&RXUWZHQWRQWRÀQGWKHFODLPSDWHQWLQHOLJLEOHFOHDUO\HVWDEOLVKLQJWKHSULQFLSOHWKDW
SUHHPSWLRQLVQRWDSUHUHTXLVLWHIRUSDWHQWLQHOLJLELOLW\7KH&RXUWMXVWLÀHGLWVGHFLVLRQ
by noting that the prohibition against patenting a fundamental principle cannot be
circumvented by attempting to limit its use to a particular technological environment, or
E\DGGLQJLQVLJQLÀFDQW´SRVWVROXWLRQDFWLYLW\µWRDFODLP266XEVHTXHQW6XSUHPH&RXUW
GHFLVLRQVKDYHH[SOLFLWO\FLWHGWKLVDVSHFWRIFlook with approval.27
Bilski IIUHDIÀUPHGWKLVSULQFLSOHRIFlook by holding that dependent claims limited
WRVSHFLÀFSUDFWLFDODSSOLFDWLRQVRIWKHDEVWUDFWLGHDDWLVVXHLQWKDWFDVH ULVNKHGJLQJ 
and thus clearly not preemptive of all practical applications of the abstract idea, were
nonetheless patent ineligible. Nevertheless, Bilski IIGRHVVHHPWRDVFULEHDVLJQLÀFDQW
role to the preemption test in analyzing for patent eligibility, pointing out that some of the
EURDGHUFODLPVDWLVVXHLQWKHFDVH´SUHHPSWXVHRI>ULVNKHGJLQJ@LQDOOÀHOGVDQGZRXOG
effectively grant a monopoly over an abstract idea.”28 While preemption is clearly not a
SUHUHTXLVLWHIRUDÀQGLQJRISDWHQWLQHOLJLELOLW\LWZRXOGVHHPWREHVXIÀFLHQW1RWKLQJ
in the Court’s decisions would suggest that a claim could preempt all substantial practical
applications of a fundamental principle and nonetheless retain patent eligibility.
While the preemption test does impose some order on the otherwise amorphous patent
HOLJLELOLW\LQTXLU\LWQRQHWKHOHVVSURYLGHVFRXUWVDPSOHURRPWRH[HUFLVHMXGLFLDOGLVFUHWLRQ
and apply the test in a manner that furthers perceived public policy objectives. For
H[DPSOHDVVDQFWLRQHGE\Flook, courts have interpreted the preemption test in a manner
such that literal preemption of all uses of a fundamental principle is not necessary in order
for a claim to fail the test. Rather, the test is often stated as whether the claim preempts
substantially all practical uses of the fundamental principle, with terms like “substantial”
DQG´SUDFWLFDOµSURYLGLQJWKHFRXUWVDQG372ÁH[LELOLW\LQDSSO\LQJWKHWHVWWRDFKLHYHWKH
“right” outcome.
)RUH[DPSOHLQPrometheus I, the inventors had discovered a correlation between the
level of certain drug metabolites observed in a patient’s body and optimal drug dosage,
and obtained patent claims directed towards methods of using the correlation to determine

25. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. at 589-90 (1978).
26. Id.
27. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191-92 (1981); Bilski II6&W ´>/@LPLWLQJDQDEVWUDFW
LGHDWRRQHÀHOGRIXVHDUHDGGLQJWRNHQSRVWVROXWLRQFRPSRQHQWV>GRHV@QRWPDNHWKHFRQFHSWSDWHQWDEOHµ 
28. 130 S. Ct. at 3231.
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whether to increase or decrease the amount of drug being given to the patient.29 The district
court invoked the preemption test and held the claims patent ineligible for preempting
all substantial practical applications of the correlation, which the court characterized as a
natural phenomenon.30 The patent owner had argued that the claims did not preempt all practical
XVHVRIWKHFRUUHODWLRQDQGEROVWHUHGLWVDUJXPHQWE\VSHFLÀFDOO\LGHQWLI\LQJVL[XVHVRIWKH
correlation that it alleged were not covered by the claims.31 The district court rejected
WKLVDUJXPHQWKRZHYHUDSSDUHQWO\FRQFOXGLQJWKDWQRQHRIWKHVHDSSOLFDWLRQVZHUHVXIÀFLHQWO\
“substantial” and/or “practical” enough to satisfy its interpretation of the preemption test.32
On appeal, however, the Federal Circuit in Prometheus II reversed, applying a much
more permissive interpretation of the preemption test to the challenged claims.33 As
articulated by the Federal Circuit, in an opinion authored by Judge Lourie, a claim fails
the preemption test only if it would entirely preempt the use of a fundamental principle.34
Conspicuously absent in the Federal Circuit’s formulation of the test is any reference to
“substantial” or “practical” uses of the fundamental principle.
Turning to the claims, Judge Lourie concluded that because they use the natural
SKHQRPHQDLQDVHULHVRIVSHFLÀFVWHSVWKH\GRQRWSUHHPSWDOOXVHVRIWKHQDWXUDO
phenomena. Notably, the Court’s decision offers no suggestion as to what sorts of
applications of the fundamental principle fall outside the scope of the claims, and makes
QRUHIHUHQFHWRWKHVL[DOOHJHGH[DPSOHVSXWIRUWKE\WKHSDWHQWRZQHU,ZRXOGVXJJHVWWKDW
under Judge Lourie’s approach to preemption analysis, the fact that a fundamental principle
LVXWLOL]HGLQDVHULHVRIVSHFLÀFVWHSVWRDFKLHYHDUHDVRQDEO\VSHFLÀFDQGSUDFWLFDOUHVXOW
LQWKLVFDVHWUHDWPHQWRIVSHFLÀFGLVHDVHE\VSHFLÀFGUXJV ZLOOEHHQRXJKWRGHIHDWDQ
allegation of patent ineligibility based on preemption, regardless of claim scope.
The divergent interpretations of the preemption test by the district court and Federal
Circuit in Prometheus LOOXVWUDWHVWKHPDOOHDELOLW\RIWKHWHVWSURYLGLQJÁH[LELOLW\IRU
WKHFRXUWVWRH[HUFLVHGLVFUHWLRQLQWKHDSSOLFDWLRQRIWKHWHVWWRSROLFHFODLPVFRSHLQD
manner the court deems to be appropriate. A court, faced with a claim it considers to be
RYHUO\H[SDQVLYHLQVFRSHFDQHVVHQWLDOO\LJQRUHWKHH[LVWHQFHRISUDFWLFDODSSOLFDWLRQVRI
the fundamental principle that fall outside the scope of the claim by characterizing the
unclaimed applications as “insubstantial” or “impractical,” and proceed to invalidate the
claim for failing to preemption test. Alternatively, a court of a different mindset could easily
uphold the validity of the same claim by concluding that the claim is not entirely preemptive,
without necessarily identifying any meaningful unclaimed application of the principle.
29. Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs. (Prometheus I), 86 U.S.P.Q.2d 1705, 1715-16 (S.D.
Cal. 2008).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs. (Prometheus II), 581 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
34. Id. at 1349-50.
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One interesting aspect of the “substantial practical application” implementation of the
preemption test is the effect of after-arising advances in technology. In order for claim
to fail the preemption test, is it necessary that the claim encompass substantially all
practical applications of the fundamental principle that might be developed in the future,
RULVSUHHPSWLRQRIDOOSUDFWLFDODSSOLFDWLRQVDVRIWKHÀOLQJGDWH RUSHUKDSVWKHGDWH
LQIULQJHPHQW VXIÀFLHQW",IWKHIRUPHUKRZLVDFRXUWH[SHFWHGWRDQWLFLSDWHDOOSUDFWLFDO
applications of a fundamental principle which might become available at some future date
EDVHGRQVXEVHTXHQWDGYDQFHVLQWHFKQRORJ\",IWKHODWWHUGRHVWKLVLPSO\WKDWDFODLPWKDW
LVSDWHQWLQHOLJLEOHDWRQHSRLQWLQWLPHPLJKWEHUHQGHUHGSDWHQWHOLJLEOHE\VXEVHTXHQW
advances in technology that create new opportunities to apply the fundamental principle
LQDSSOLFDWLRQVIDOOLQJRXWVLGHWKHVFRSHRIWKHFODLP"2UZRXOGSUHHPSWLRQDQDO\VLVEH
ORFNHGLQWRWKHVWDWHRIWKHDUWDWWKHWLPHWKHSDWHQWDSSOLFDWLRQZDVÀOHG RUSHUKDSVDW
WKHWLPHWKHFODLPZDVÀUVWDGGHGWRWKHSDWHQWDSSOLFDWLRQRUWKHGDWHWKHSDWHQWLVVXHV" 
VXFKWKDWHYHQWKRXJKDIWHUWKHSDWHQWLVVXHVWKHUHH[LVWVVXEVWDQWLDOSUDFWLFDOXVHVRIWKH
fundamental principle lying outside the claim, the claim is nonetheless patent ineligible
EHFDXVHWKHVHXVHVRQO\EHFDPHSUDFWLFDODIWHUWKHDSSOLFDWLRQZDVÀOHG"
At this point is perhaps worth noting that some language from Supreme Court precedent
VXJJHVWVWKDWWKHH[WHQWWRZKLFKDSDWHQWFODLPHQFRPSDVVHVDSSOLFDWLRQVRIDIXQGDPHQWDO
SULQFLSOH´XQNQRZQµDWWKHWLPHRILQYHQWLRQLVUHOHYDQWWRWKHTXHVWLRQRISDWHQWHOLJLELOLW\35
7KLVDSSURDFKLVUHODWHGWRWKHSUHHPSWLRQWHVWEXWIRFXVHVVSHFLÀFDOO\RQ´XQNQRZQµ
applications of the fundamental principle, rather than “practical” applications. This
approach to patent eligibility does not seem to have garnered much traction in the courts
in recent years, although Lemley et al. suggest that a focus on “unknown” uses could
establish a meaningful doctrinal role for patent eligibility, a doctrine which they suggest is
otherwise largely redundant with enablement and written description.36
To my mind, the doctrines of enablement and written description are perfectly capable
and better suited for addressing the policy concerns associated with claims encompassing
HPERGLPHQWVRIDQLQYHQWLRQXQNQRZQDVRIWKHÀOLQJGDWH3UHFHGHQWFOHDUO\HVWDEOLVKHV
WKDWDFODLPUHFLWLQJHPERGLPHQWVXQNQRZQDQGXQDWWDLQDEOHDVRIWKHÀOLQJGDWHFDQEXW
GRHVQRWQHFHVVDULO\UXQDIRXORIWKHHQDEOHPHQWDQGZULWWHQGHVFULSWLRQUHTXLUHPHQWV
and the patent eligibility doctrine should not be made available as a backdoor to achieve
a different result.37 Instead, patent policy would be better served if the courts, most
SDUWLFXODUO\WKH)HGHUDO&LUFXLWIRFXVHGPRUHHQHUJ\RQUHÀQLQJWKHHQDEOHPHQWGRFWULQH

35. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 68 (1972). This aspect of patent eligibility doctrine is discussed by
Lemley et al., supra note 17, at 17-18.
36. Lemley et al., supra note 17.
/L]DUG7HFK,QFY(DUWK5HV0DSSLQJ,QF)G )HG&LU  DIÀUPLQJZULWWHQ
description-based invalidation of claims for encompassing embodiments of the invention unknown as of the
ÀOLQJGDWH In re *RRGPDQ)G )HG&LU  ÀQGLQJDFODLPEURDGO\HQFRPSDVVLQJJHQHWLFDOO\PRGLÀHGPRQRFRWVDQGGLFRWVLQYDOLGIRUODFNRIHQDEOHPHQWEHFDXVHJHQHWLFDOO\PRGLÀHGPRQRFRWV
ZHUHXQNQRZQDVRIWKHÀOLQJGDWH 
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as a doctrinal tool for policing claim scope, generally applicable to embodiments of the
FODLPHGLQYHQWLRQERWKNQRZQDQGXQNQRZQDVRIWKHÀOLQJGDWH38
IV.

The Machine or Transformation Test Implicitly Addresses Claim Scope

Although Bilski II rejected the Federal Circuit’s assertion that MORT is the sole and
GHÀQLWLYHWHVWLWE\QRPHDQVGLVDYRZHGWKHXVHRI0257LQDVVHVVLQJSDWHQWHOLJLELOLW\7R
the contrary, the Court acknowledged that MORT is in many cases a “useful and important
FOXHDQLQYHVWLJDWLYHWRROµIRUDQVZHULQJWKHXOWLPDWHTXHVWLRQRIZKHWKHUDFODLPSDWHQWV
a fundamental principle. In view of the fact that Bilski II does not offer any alternative
“clues” or “tools” to assist the lower courts in this regard, and the fact that a majority of the
judges on the Federal Circuit have so recently voiced their approval of MORT, I predict that
courts will continue to rely heavily on MORT in assessing patent eligibility. This prediction
LVERUQHRXWIRUH[DPSOHLQWKH)HGHUDO&LUFXLW·VUHFHQWPrometheus II decision, in which
the claims were found to be patent eligible based almost entirely on a MORT analysis.
On the other hand, under Bilski II a court can at its discretion ignore MORT in its patent
eligibility analysis. This approach can be seen in Research Corporation Technologies v.
Microsoft, another recent Federal Circuit decision case that upheld the patent eligibility of
the challenged claims, but this time without any reference to MORT.39
MORT can function as a doctrinal tool for policing claim scope that complements the
SUHHPSWLRQWHVW)RUH[DPSOHLQPrometheus II the claimed invention was based on the
GLVFRYHU\RIDFRUUHODWLRQEHWZHHQWKHOHYHORIVSHFLÀFGUXJPHWDEROLWHVLQWKHSDWLHQW·V
body and the optimal dosage of the drug for that patient. The Federal Circuit stated in dicta
that a claim broadly directed to this correlation, which could be infringed by mere mental
steps, such as a doctor warning a patient that he should reduce his drug dosage based on the
result of a test showing high levels of drug metabolite, would be per se patent ineligible.
However, in fact none of the claims were this broad, since all included additional steps of
administering a drug to patient and or determining the level of drug metabolite in a patient’s
body. These steps were held to be inherently transformative, thus satisfying MORT. In
VKRUWWKHUHTXLUHPHQWRIDWUDQVIRUPDWLYHVWHSOLPLWVWKHDYDLODELOLW\RISDWHQWSURWHFWLRQWR
methods of using the correlation involving actual treatment of the patient and/or analysis
of a biological sample. As applied in Prometheus II, MORT functions to defuse concerns
that parties like Prometheus might be able to obtain patent protection of such broad scope
that it could be used to prevent doctors from thinking about the correlations, or from
communicating with their patients.
38. Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 560 F.3d 1366, 1381 (Linn, J., concurring) (opining that the appropriate doctrinal total for policing claim scope is enablement, not written description, and bemoaning the fact
WKDWWKH&RXUWKDV´OHIWXQUHVROYHGµWKHTXHVWLRQRIWRZKDWH[WHQWWKHHQDEOHPHQWUHTXLUHPHQWFRQVWUDLQVWKH
ability of an inventor to claim “known and unknown” embodiments of the invention).
39. Research Corp. Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 627 F.3d 859, 868-69 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
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7KHPDFKLQHSURQJRI0257FDQDOVREHHPSOR\HGWROLPLWFODLPVFRSH)RUH[DPSOH
in Ex parte Sesek, the invention was a method of “notifying a carrier in a mass mailing
operation of an anticipated mail load to allow the carrier to adapt to the mail load instead of
merely reacting to it.”40 The Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (BPAI) rejected the
claims as patent ineligible, for failure to satisfy either prong of MORT, but did not reject
corresponding claims limited to an apparatus for performing the method.41
/LNHWKHSUHHPSWLRQWHVW0257LVVXIÀFLHQWO\PDOOHDEOHWRSHUPLWDFRXUWWRDUULYH
at a desired outcome based on the stringency by which the test is applied. In Bilski I, the
Federal Circuit held that the presence of a machine or transformation is not necessarily
VXIÀFLHQWWRVDWLVI\0257SDUWLFXODUO\LIWKHLQYROYHPHQWRIDPDFKLQHRUWUDQVIRUPDWLRQ
LVIRXQGWREHPHUH´H[WUDVROXWLRQDFWLYLW\µ42 The ability to dismiss machine-implemented
RUWUDQVIRUPDWLYHVWHSVDVPHUHH[WUDVROXWLRQDFWLYLW\SURYLGHVVXEVWDQWLDOGLVFUHWLRQIRUD
court to apply to MORT in a manner that achieves the desired result.
)RUH[DPSOHLQClassen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC the Federal Circuit
KHOGWKDWDFODLPWKDWVSHFLÀFDOO\UHFLWHGDVWHSRILPPXQL]LQJSDWLHQWVQRQHWKHOHVVIDLOHG
MORT.43 Immunizing a patient against disease clearly transforms a patient; Prometheus
II, decided after Classen, unambiguously states that treating a patient is inherently
transformative.447KHRQO\UDWLRQDOH[SODQDWLRQIRUWKHRXWFRPHLQClassen would appear
WREHWKDWWKH)HGHUDO&LUFXLWGLVUHJDUGHGWKHLPPXQL]DWLRQVWHSDVPHUHH[WUDVROXWLRQ
DFWLYLW\DQDQDO\WLFDOH[SHGLHQWH[SOLFLWO\VDQFWLRQHGE\Bilski I.
Similarly, in Prometheus II the Federal Circuit cited with approval In re Grams, a 1989
Federal Circuit decision that held patent ineligible a claim directed toward a method that
involves performing a clinical test on individuals and applying an algorithm to the data
generated by the test.45 In a manner reminiscent of Classen, the Court simply disregarded
the inherently transformative clinical testing step in its patent eligibility analysis as mere
GDWDJDWKHULQJH[WUDVROXWLRQDFWLYLW\46
In Every Penny Counts v. Bank of America Corp.,47 the district court applied a similar
DSSURDFKWRFRQFOXGHWKDWFODLPVGLUHFWHGWRZDUGDSURFHVVWKDWLQKHUHQWO\UHTXLUHVWKHXVH
of a machine nonetheless failed MORT based on its conclusion that the involvement of
WKHPDFKLQHUHSUHVHQWHGRQO\LQVLJQLÀFDQWH[WUDVROXWLRQDFWLYLW\,QWKLVFDVHWKHGLVWULFW
FRXUWIRXQGWKDWWKHFODLPHGSURFHVVQHFHVVDULO\UHTXLUHVWKHXVHRIPDFKLQHVRUFRPSXWHUV

40. Ex parte Sesek, at 1, No. 2009-0458, 2009 WL 803089 (B.P.A.I. Mar. 25, 2009).
41. Id. at 4-6.
42. Bilski I, 545 F.3d 943, 961-62 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
&ODVVHQ,PPXQRWKHUDSLHV,QFY%LRJHQ,'(&)$SS·[ )HG&LU 
44. Prometheus II, 628 F.3d 1347, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
45. In re Grams, 888 F.2d 835, 840-41 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
46. See id. at 839.
47. Every Penny Counts, Inc. v. Bank of Am. Corp., 2009 WL 6853402 at 2-3 (M.D. Fla. 2009).
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to work, and hence does not impose any limits on the process itself. Thus, this is another
H[DPSOHRIXVLQJWKHH[SHGLHQWRIGHFODULQJDVWHSPHUHH[WUDVROXWLRQDFWLYLW\WRLQYDOLGDWH
a claim the court clearly considers overly broad.
V.

7KH0DQQHULQ:KLFKWKH&RXUW'HÀQHVWKH´)XQGDPHQWDO3ULQFLSOHµ
at Stake Can Impact Patent Scope

The manner in which a court or the PTO interprets the meaning of “fundamental
SULQFLSOHµFDQGLFWDWHWKHUROHRISDWHQWHOLJLELOLW\LQSROLFLQJFODLPVFRSH)RUH[DPSOH
HYHQDQH[WUHPHO\EURDGFODLPZLOOSDVVPXVWHULIWKHFRXUWFRQFOXGHVWKDWWKH´SULQFLSOHµ
captured by the claim is not “fundamental.” We see this in Research Corporation
Technologies, wherein the Federal Circuit held that, because the claimed method provides
DIXQFWLRQDODQGSDOSDEOHXWLOLW\LQWKHÀHOGRIFRPSXWHUWHFKQRORJ\WKHGLVWULFWFRXUWZDV
incorrect in characterizing the idea behind the claim as “abstract.” With no “abstract idea”
implicated by the claim, it necessarily follows that the claims could not be patent ineligible
for claiming an abstract idea, regardless of how broadly the “non-abstract idea” behind the
FODLPLVFODLPHG%\GHÀQLQJDEVWUDFWLGHDLQVXFKDUHVWULFWHGPDQQHUWKH&RXUWHIIHFWLYHO\
negates the role of patent eligibility in policing claim scope. The district court, in contrast,
KDGVXEVFULEHGWRDPRUHH[SDQVLYHGHÀQLWLRQRIZKDWLWPHDQVWREHDQ´DEVWUDFWLGHDµ
resulting in the divergent outcomes.
Different interpretations of what it means to be a “natural phenomenon” might also
H[SODLQWKHFRQÁLFWLQJUXOLQJVHPDQDWLQJIURPWKHGLVWULFWFRXUWDQG)HGHUDO&LUFXLW
in Prometheus$VGLVFXVVHGDERYHWKHGLVWULFWFRXUWVHHPHGWRDGRSWDQXQMXVWLÀDEO\
H[SDQVLYHGHÀQLWLRQRIQDWXUDOSKHQRPHQDFKDUDFWHUL]LQJWKHFRUUHODWLRQEHWZHHQWKH
PHWDEROLFEUHDNGRZQSURGXFWVRIDGHÀQHGFDWHJRU\RIQRQQDWXUDOO\RFFXUULQJGUXJV LH
certain thiopurine drugs) and the optimal dosage of the drug as a natural phenomenon. While
WKH)HGHUDO&LUFXLWGLGQRWH[SOLFLWO\DGGUHVVWKHGLVWULFWFRXUW·VTXHVWLRQDEOHGHÀQLWLRQRI
QDWXUDOSKHQRPHQRQLWVGHFLVLRQWRUHYHUVHWKHGLVWULFWFRXUWPLJKWEHH[SODLQHGE\DVVXPLQJ
WKDWWKH)HGHUDO&LUFXLWGHÀQHGWKHUHOHYDQWQDWXUDOSKHQRPHQRQGLIIHUHQWO\$WRQHSRLQW
in Prometheus II, WKH)HGHUDO&LUFXLWH[SODLQVWKDWWKHFKDOOHQJHGFODLPVDUHGLUHFWHG
towards an application “of naturally occurring correlations between metabolite levels and
HIÀFDF\RUWR[LFLW\DQGWKXVGRQRWZKROO\SUHHPSWDOOXVHVRIWKHUHFLWHGFRUUHODWLRQVµ48
7KLVVWDWHPHQWVXJJHVWVWKDWSHUKDSVWKH)HGHUDO&LUFXLWGHÀQHGWKHIXQGDPHQWDOSULQFLSOH
implicated by the claims more broadly, i.e., as the general phenomenon that a correlation
H[LVWVEHWZHHQWKHOHYHORIGUXJPHWDEROLWHLQWKHERG\DQGGUXJHIÀFDF\DQGWR[LFLW\
DVRSSRVHGWRWKHPRUHVSHFLÀFFRUUHODWLRQLQYROYLQJWKLRSXULQHGUXJVLGHQWLÀHGE\WKH
district court. As such, the Federal Circuit’s “natural phenomenon” encompassed all drugs
JHQHUDOO\DQGWKXVZDVQRWSUHHPSWHGE\FODLPVOLPLWHGWRDVSHFLÀFFDWHJRU\RIGUXJV7KH
GLVWULFWFRXUW·V´QDWXUDOSKHQRPHQRQµRQWKHRWKHUKDQGZDVOLPLWHGWRDVSHFLÀFFDWHJRU\
of drugs, which the court found to be effectively preempted by the claims.
48. Prometheus II, 628 F.3d at 1355.
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Note the analogy between what occurred in Research Corporation Technologies and the
foregoing interpretation of Prometheus. In both cases, the district court adopted a relatively
narrow interpretation of the fundamental principle at stake, and found the claim invalid for
HIIHFWLYHO\SUHHPSWLQJWKHIXQGDPHQWDOSULQFLSOH2QDSSHDOWKH)HGHUDO&LUFXLWGHÀQHGWKH
fundamental principle more broadly, and based on this interpretation reversed the lower court.
In Research Corporation TechnologiesWKH)HGHUDO&LUFXLWDFKLHYHGWKLVHQGE\ÀQGLQJWKDW
no fundamental principle (i.e., abstract idea) was implicated by the claims. In Prometheus,
on the other hand, the Federal Circuit acknowledged that the claims implicated a natural
SKHQRPHQRQEXWDIWHUGHÀQLQJWKHQDWXUDOSKHQRPHQRQPRUHEURDGO\KDGQRWURXEOHFRQFOXGLQJ
WKDWWKHFODLPVDUHSDWHQWHOLJLEOHE\YLUWXHRIEHLQJOLPLWHGWRFHUWDLQVSHFLÀFDSSOLFDWLRQVRI
the phenomenon, i.e., a limited category of drugs. While the Prometheus claims appeared
RYHUO\EURDGXQGHUWKHGLVWULFWFRXUW·VQDUURZGHÀQLWLRQRIWKHQDWXUDOSKHQRPHQRQIURPWKH
perspective of the Federal Circuit the claims are relatively narrow, limited as they are to an
DSSOLFDWLRQRIWKHQDWXUDOSKHQRPHQRQ DVWKH\GHÀQHGLW WRDVSHFLÀFFDWHJRU\RIGUXJV
This interpretation of Prometheus IIPLJKWDOVRKHOSH[SODLQWKHGLIIHUHQWRXWFRPHVLQ
that case and In re Grams.49 In both cases, the challenged claims recited a method that
involved obtaining clinical laboratory data from a patient and applying what the court
characterized as a fundamental principle to the data, resulting in clinically useful diagnostic
information. In PrometheusWKHFODLPLVOLPLWHGWRDIDLUO\VSHFLÀFFDWHJRU\RIGUXJV
leaving most applications of the fundamental principle outside the scope of the claims. In
contrast, the Grams claim broadly recited applying the fundamental principle to “clinical
ODERUDWRU\WHVWVµLQJHQHUDOUDWKHUWKDQEHLQJOLPLWHGWRDQ\VSHFLÀFFOLQLFDOODERUDWRU\
test or tests. The greater preemptive effect of Grams’ claims, in contrast with the relatively
VSHFLÀFDSSOLFDWLRQRIDIXQGDPHQWDOSULQFLSOHFODLPHGE\3URPHWKHXVFRXOGSURYLGHD
SULQFLSOHGGLVWLQFWLRQWKDWZRXOGH[SODLQWKHGLYHUJHQWRXWFRPHVLQWKHFDVHV
Alternatively, the Federal Circuit could have arrived at the same outcome in Prometheus
II E\ÀQGLQJWKDWWKHDOOHJHGQDWXUDOSKHQRPHQRQLGHQWLÀHGE\WKHGLVWULFWFRXUWZDVQRW
in fact “natural.” On the initial appeal of Prometheus WRWKH)HGHUDO&LUFXLW,ÀOHGDQ
DPLFXVEULHIH[SODLQLQJP\SRVLWLRQWKDWWKHGLVWULFWFRXUWKDGHUUHGLQFKDUDFWHUL]LQJD
correlation involving a synthetic, non-naturally occurring drug breakdown product as a
natural phenomenon.50 In that brief I argued that the correlation does not and cannot occur
naturally, since it only arises as a result of the administration of a synthetic drug to patient.
By limiting the applicability of the doctrine of patent eligibility to claims implicating truly
natural phenomena, courts could modulate the effect of the doctrine on claim breadth.
49. As I pointed out in a post to my blog, I found the Federal Circuit’s attempt to distinguish the two cases
provided by Prometheus II less than entirely convincing. Chris Holman, On Remand, Federal Circuit (Once
Again) Decides Prometheus v. Mayo in Favor of Patent Eligibility for Methods of Treatment and Diagnostic Tests, HOLMAN’S BIOTECH IP BLOG (Dec. 17, 2010, 3:22 PM), http://holmansbiotechipblog.blogspot.
com/2010/12/on-remand-federal-circuit-once-again.html.
50. See Brief of Amici Curiae Interested Patent Law Professors in Support of Neither Party at 11, Prometheus
Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 628 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (No. 2008-1403).
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)RUH[DPSOHFRQVLGHUWKHFDVHRIDUHVHDUFKHUZKRKDVGLVFRYHUHGDFRUUHODWLRQEHWZHHQ
DVSHFLÀFJHQHWLFYDULDWLRQDQGWKHVXLWDELOLW\RIDSDUWLFXODUGUXJIRUDSDWLHQWEHDULQJ
that genetic variation, i.e., a personalized medicine invention. A court could reasonably
conclude that since the correlation involves a non-naturally occurring drug, it is not a
natural phenomenon, and thus patent eligibility is not implicated, regardless of how broadly
the researcher chooses to claim a diagnostic method applying the correlation to healthcare.
On the other hand, assuming that the genetic variation occurs naturally, and thus could be
rightly characterized as a natural phenomenon, the doctrine of patent eligibility would be
available to preclude the researcher from obtaining a claim broadly reciting the genetic
variation per se, untethered to its correlation with a non-naturally occurring drug.
The virtue of this approach might lie in its ability to provide a principled doctrinal tool
for distinguishing between claims broadly reciting diagnostic testing for naturally occurring
genetic variations, which have become highly controversial and widely unpopular, and
personalized medicine claims directed toward correlations between genetic variation and
optimal drug treatment regimen. It is widely believed that personalized medicine has the
potential to play a critical role in advancing future healthcare, and should the courts decide
to use patent eligibility to invalidate unpopular “gene patents” claims, such as those at issue
in Ass’n for Molecular Pathology,51 it is important that they do so in a manner that does
QRWXQGXO\SUHMXGLFHWKHDELOLW\RISHUVRQDOL]HGPHGLFLQHLQQRYDWRUVWRREWDLQDGHTXDWHSDWHQW
protection for their discoveries. This important policy objective might be achieved by limiting the
applicability of the doctrine of patent eligibility to claims implicating truly “natural” phenomena.
VI.

Policing Claim Scope by Limiting Claims to the Statutory Categories of
Patentable Subject Matter

Under Section 101 of the patent statute, only machines, articles of manufacture,
compositions of matter, and processes are patent eligible.52 These terms have been
interpreted broadly, to encompass living organisms, chemical compounds, and in at least
one case an elemental particle (Element 95, i.e., Americium).53 However, the recent decision
in Nuijten invalidating a claim to a signal illustrates that at some point the Federal Circuit is
willing to draw the line and declare a claim patent ineligible for claiming subject matter that
LVQHLWKHUDSURFHVVQRUSURGXFWDVGHÀQHGE\6HFWLRQ54 Similarly, in Bilski II the Court
H[SOLFLWO\SRLQWHGWRWKHVWDWXWRU\GHÀQLWLRQRISURFHVVDVDOLPLWDWLRQRQSDWHQWHOLJLELOLW\
Moving forward, the courts could potentially adopt a more stringent interpretation of what
it means to be a patent eligible product or process under section 101 as another doctrinal
policy lever to regulate claim scope.

$VV·QIRU0ROHFXODU3DWKRORJ\Y863DWHQW 7UDGHPDUN2IÀFH)6XSSG 6'1<
2010).
52. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
53. See In re Seaborg, 328 F.2d 996 (C.C.P.A. 1964).
54. See supra Part II.
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VII.

What Role Will Patent Eligibility Play in Policing Claim Scope?

Clearly, under Bilski II the lower courts are empowered to deploy patent eligibility as a
doctrinal tool for policing claim scope. Because Bilski II leaves the test for patent eligibility
ODUJHO\XQGHÀQHGWKHORZHUFRXUWVDQG372LQSDUWLFXODUWKH)HGHUDO&LUFXLWFRXOG
actively invoke the doctrine as a “wildcard” to invalidate patent claims deemed unduly
broad, or otherwise “unworthy” by the court. Judge Rader made a similar observation
UHFHQWO\ZLWKUHVSHFWWRWKH/LOO\ZULWWHQGHVFULSWLRQUHTXLUHPHQWDQRWKHUGRFWULQHRI
SDWHQWDELOLW\IRUZKLFKWKHFULWHULDIRUFRPSOLDQFHUHPDLQVODUJHO\XQGHÀQHG55
However, early indications suggest that the Federal Circuit and PTO are disinclined
to invoke patent eligibility as a front-line doctrinal tool for policing claim scope. There
are already more appropriate doctrinal tools for policing claim scope, most particularly
WKHHQDEOHPHQWUHTXLUHPHQWEXWLQFUHDVLQJO\LQUHFHQW\HDUVWKHZULWWHQGHVFULSWLRQ
UHTXLUHPHQW,QPRVWFDVHVWKHVHGRFWULQHVZLOOEHWKHPRUHDSSURSULDWHYHKLFOHIRU
JXDUGLQJDJDLQVWRYHUO\H[SDQVLYHFODLPLQJRILQYHQWLRQV
)RUH[DPSOHLQPrometheus II the Federal Circuit went out of its way to articulate a
permissive approach to patent eligibility analysis that emphatically supports the patent
eligibility of method claims reciting a step of administering a drug or otherwise treating a
patient, or of obtaining and/or analyzing a biological sample from a patient. In Research
Corporation Technology, a different panel of the Federal Circuit issued a broad holding
to the effect that any invention providing a functional and palpable application addressing
a technological need is patent eligible. In that decision, Judge Rader stresses that under
his interpretation of Bilski II, patent eligibility should not become a substitute for a
SDWHQWDELOLW\DQDO\VLVUHODWHGWRSULRUDUWDGHTXDWHGLVFORVXUHRURWKHUUHTXLUHPHQWVRI
patentability. In the words of Judge Rader, “section 101 does not permit a court to reject
VXEMHFWPDWWHUFDWHJRULFDOO\EHFDXVHLWÀQGVWKDWDFODLPLVQRWZRUWK\RIDSDWHQWµ56
6LPLODUO\WKH372KDVLQVWUXFWHGLWVH[DPLQHUVWR´DYRLGIRFXVLQJRQLVVXHVRISDWHQW
eligibility under § 101 to the detriment of considering an application for compliance with
WKHUHTXLUHPHQWVRIDQGDQGDYRLGWUHDWLQJDQDSSOLFDWLRQVROHO\
on the basis of patent-eligibility under § 101 except in the most extreme cases.”57 This
suggests to me that, like the Federal Circuit, the PTO does not intend to implement Bilski II
LQDPDQQHUWKDWVXEVWDQWLDOO\DOWHUVWKHFULWHULDIRUSDWHQWDELOLW\DVDSSOLHGE\WKHRIÀFH
In conclusion, at this point in time it seems apparent that while under Bilski II patent
eligibility is available to the courts and PTO as a doctrinal tool for policing claim scope,

55. Ariad Pharm. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (Rader, J, dissenting).
56. Research Corp. Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 627 F.3d 859, 868 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
57. Interim Guidance for Determining Subject Matter Eligibility for Process Claims in View of Bilski v. Kappos, 75 Fed. Reg. 43,922, 43923-24 (2010) (emphasis added).
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early indications are that the doctrine will not be invoked in cases where other doctrines are
available to accomplish the same end. That said, some situations might very well warrant
the use of patent eligibility, particularly to police against claims drafted so broadly as to
encompass mental thoughts, mere analysis or manipulation of data, or other processes too
far removed from what one would generally characterize as “technology.”
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